CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited. 50X1-HUM USSR COUNTRY 50X1-HUM REPORT SUBJECT Soviet Strategic Concepts DATE DISTR. 28 April 1955 NO. OF PAGES DATE OF INFO. REQUIREMENT NO. 50X1-HUM PLACE ACQUIRED REFERENCES THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE) 50X1-HUM 1. a speech was made prior to 14 February 1955 by General Kurochkin, commanding officer of the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow. This speech reportedly caused considerable excitement in Soviet circles. General Kurochkin spoke on the subject of Soviet global strategy: 50X1-HUM An exaggerated amount of importance is being given to Europe and to the so-called "German bastion". Soviet global strategy should be freed from old concepts. Germany is not indispensable as a Soviet operating base. Should there be a new world war involving the USSR and the United States, Western Europe would not be an ideal base from which to attack the United States. It is 6,000 kilometers from the Elbe to Washington and present-day military technique does not provide for the transportation of large armie: over such a distance. Moreover, the USSR would keep constantly engaged in Europe at least 50 divisions; and the great German and French industrial centers would not fall intact into Soviet hands. Soviet operations in Europe would be justified only if there were a threat of an American offensive from the Elbe. Such an offensive is impossible without the Germans. For this reason, the USSR opposes and will delay as long as possible the rearmament of West Germany. A neutralized Germany would be most advantageous to the Soviets. In the event of war, the Americans must be attacked directly. It is easier to do this from the Bering Straits than it is from Brest or La Rochelle. If the USSR is to strike America in her vital parts, a bridgehead must be established in Alaska so that Soviet atomic bombers can take off from 50X1-HUM Alaskan air bases. 50X1-HUM 80 percent of Soviet strategic bombers have been transported to Eastern Siberia; that a high command of troops with atomic weapons has been established at Magadan; that numerous air bases, some of them underground, have been constructed on Sakhalin, Kamchatka, and in the Kurile Islands; that Soviet land forces S-E-C-R-E-T 50X1-HUM STATE ARMY EV X NAVY AIR х X FBI Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By

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